

MNC-I BUA Intel Daily Slides

Nov 07

Upcoming Iraq Neighbors Conference in Istanbul


- (U) Scheduled for 2-3 Nov, FM from Iraq's neighbors, reps from UNSC-5 + SG, and G-8 to attend
- (U) Likely topics include:
 - (U) Strengthening effort of 3 working groups established at May session
 - (U) Refugees and internally displaced persons
 - (U) Border security
 - (U) Energy
 - (U) Stability and reconciliation in Iraq
 - (U) UNSG's proposal to open a center for national Iraqi reconciliation in Baghdad
 - (U) Crisis over potential for Turkish CBO
 - (U) Concerns over 'semi-independence' of Iraqi Kurds
- (U) FM Zebari – "This meeting is very important and should not be hijacked by the current tension and crisis over the [KGK] terrorist activities in Turkey."



(U) PM Maliki addresses Baghdad
Neighbors Meeting, Sep 07

1.4b, 1.4d

HP Attack Density in Baghdad – AQI Peak to Present



Assessment: The frequency and effectiveness of AQI's trademark high-profile attacks have been degraded in the capital since peak of activity in Nov 2006. However, AQI has repeatedly proven resilient and a sustained level of targeted pressure will be required to prevent a re-emergence.

Sadr Back In Iran

- **Muqtada al-Sadr returns to Iran for unspecified reasons**
 - Reportedly left in late October
 - Third trip to Iran in '07
 - Initially planned to return in mid October
- **OMS office opening in Qom**



Assessment: While motivation for Sadr's return remains unknown, he may intend to pursue religious studies more seriously. Due to steadily increasing pressures from the Shi'a populace, Sadr may realize importance of solidifying his religious credentials to further back his lineage and enhance his current position.

Ocalan and Erdal's Conflicting Message

(b)(6)



(U)

Abdullah Ocalan



(U)

Bahoz Erdal


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Iran / Iraq Electricity Project Moves Forward

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Classified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201505

- (U) Iran has repeatedly offered to help provide electric power service
 - (U) Iran currently exports an average of 90-125 MW to Diyala via a 154-kV transmission line
- ~~(S//REL IRQ)~~ Iran and Iraq agreed to build a 70-km 400-kV transmission line from Abadan, IR to Hartha, IZ
 - ~~(S//REL IRQ)~~ Line in Iran complete; last 20-30 km in Iraq stalled, June 2007 due to mine fields
 - (U) The deputy governor of Basrah Province announced in October that an Iranian group will clear the mine fields
 - (U) When completed the project will carry about 200 MW to Basrah Province



(U) The Hartha to Abadan 400-kV line

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Continued Attacks on MG Jalil

- Attacks targeting Basrah PDoP MG Jalil

- Jalil's vehicle attacked by SAF on 24 Oct
- Convoy attacked with IED on 3 Nov

- Trouble with the Basrah Provincial Council

- Council voted unanimously to remove Jalil
- Mol confirms Jalil as permanent PDoP
- Post-Ramadan crackdown on JAM likely spurred retaliation attacks against Jalil



Assessment: Jalil will continue to be targeted by political opposition and criminal elements within Basrah as he maintains his focus on removing sectarian actors from within the police force and improving security within the city.

JAM Focusing on Social Issues

- OMS/JAM officials met in Najaf late Oct, pass bylaw pertaining to al-Mahdi activities in Iraq
 - Freeze in JAM operations would remain in affect until April 2008
 - Beyond Apr 2008, expected to forfeit militia responsibilities and focus on social and cultural organization similar to Badr
 - JAM members expected to go through religious education curriculum
 - JAM surveillance and interrogation departments eliminated



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Response to Iran's Nuclear Program

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- (U) Tougher sanctions?
 - US, UK, France, Russia, China & Germany
 - Meet again 19 Nov to assess IAEA report
 - May agree to push ahead with third round of tougher sanctions
- (U) Alternative plan
 - GCC proposed “consortium” compromise
 - Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia & UAE would develop uranium enrichment plant in state outside of the Middle East – perhaps Switzerland
- (U) IAEA – new report in mid-November 07
 - Has Iran answered all the questions about its nuclear activities?
- (U) Ahmadinejad issues general threat
 - “If you want to cooperate with our enemy, we won’t be able to react in a friendly manner any more...”



Prince Saud al-Faisal said he hoped US and Iran would support the planned consortium [AP]



Iranian & UN Officials begin new talks in Tehran



President Ahmadinejad

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OIC Office in Baghdad

- (U) Organization of the Islamic Conference plans to open first office in Baghdad
 - Office to be headed by ambassador
 - High-level delegation visit also planned
- (U) Secretary General Ihsanoglu-
 - “What is going on [in Iraq] in the name of religion, has nothing to do with religion”
- (U) Newly established OIC Ministerial Contact Group on Iraq
 - Visibly increase contribution to peace and stability efforts in Iraq
- (U) OIC initiative to hold second round of National Reconciliation Conference in Mecca.



OIC SG
Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu



Organization of the
Islamic Conference

~~(C//REL)~~ **Assessment:** OIC sponsored Mecca Declaration in 2006 demanded end to sectarian feuds. Gol pushing for greater security cooperation from neighbors and international community. Favorable security situation in Baghdad opening door to increased cooperation and international engagement.

Sunni Resistance Response to UBL Speech

- Insurgency quick to respond to UBL's speech in which he admitted the Iraqi jihad had made mistakes and urged insurgent unity
- Political Council for the Iraqi Resistance (PCIR)
 - Call to insurgents to correct mistakes and unify
 - Does not rule out unification with AQI in the future
- Association of Muslim Scholars (AMS)
 - Mistakes on the ground dissipated jihad action, contributed to formation of 'awakening councils'
 - Positive changes on the ground would occur if mistakes are rectified



Groups in the PCIR



AMS logo

Assessment: UBL's speech will have limited effect on the insurgency. Although insurgent unification remains pervasive theme, AQI is not welcome to join without major overhaul of their tactics. The AMS will continue to publicly promote CF as greater enemy than AQI.

KGK an International Issue

- KGK financing from global network of legitimate and illicit activity
 - Narcotics, extortion primary source of illicit income
- Kurdish owned media used to spread propaganda and further KGK agenda
- Pro-KGK demonstrations
 - 03 NOV pro-KGK rallies throughout Europe
 - Early NOV demonstrations in major US cities



(U) Kurdish Immigrant Populations

Assessment: Nonkinetic measures such as cutting off funding and disrupting illicit activities in Europe could effectively counter financial and logistical support to KGK fighters based in Iraq.

Muthanna al-Dhari Changes Stance on PCIR

- Muthanna reluctantly agreed to reconsider 1920 Revolutionary Brigade participation in the Political Council for Iraqi Resistance (PCIR) on the provision:
 - PCIR returns to original structure initially agreed upon
 - Association of Muslim Scholars (AMS) to serve as political arm, the various insurgent factions as military wing
 - PCIR must issue statement expressing respect for AMS and its role in opposing the occupation; invite AMS to join as the foundation upon which the council was built
 - Only insurgent groups which are strictly opposed to the occupation could participate



1920 Rev Bde logo



Muthanna al-Dhari

Assessment: PCIR is unlikely to accept conditions set for 1920 Rev Bde to join the council as members will not wish to relegate themselves to role of military arm of AMS. PCIR is aware a non-combative approach is needed; therefore, PCIR not opposed to engagement with CF.



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Approved for Release

Tribal Sheikh Targeted

- Bombing of sheikh's house IVO Khalis, 9 November at 1815L
- Sheikh Faiz Lafta A'lewy, leader of Obeidi tribe killed, along with 2 civilians; 1 civilian injured
- Sheikh Faiz had meeting with IA, CF earlier in the day
- Attack occurred during follow-on meeting between tribal leaders at Sheikh Faiz's home
- Likely perpetrated by AQI affiliates reinfiltrated or holding out in region after OP ARROWHEAD RIPPER



SHEIK FAIZ LAFTA A'LEWY

Assessment: AQI likely targeted sheikhs in effort to regain key strategic territory, LOCs. Indigenous resistance to extremism likely seen as greatest threat to long-term viability of AQI organization.

12 November Anniversary of Sadiq al Sadr's Death

• Threats of VBIEDs currently reported


- 2x VBIED targeting Najaf
- Multiple VBIED planned in Baghdad

• Intra-Shi'a violence possible

- JAM likely intends to provide security at commemorations
- Clashes similar to Karbala possible between ISF, JAM

• Past commemorations

- 2006: 6x VBIEDs in Sadr City: 181x CIV killed, 247x CIV injured; Basrah rally, Sadr City ceremony
- 2005: 800,000 Sadiq followers peacefully marched in Najaf, gathering in Diwaniyah; no reports of violence



Assessment: Multiple threats of HP attacks possibly linked to commemoration in AQI attempt to maximize effects with limited resources. Intra-Shi'a clashes remain possible between ISF, JAM in competing attempts to provide security.

Sadr Distancing Himself from SG Violence

- Statement allegedly broadcast at mosques indicating JAM permitted to exist but SG unlawful and an enemy of the Imam
- Rumors reportedly circulating among congregations of various mosques that Sadr ordered SG to disband
- Sadr Demands Statements of Loyalty
 - Sadr orders four SG commanders to declare allegiance to him



Assessment: Sadr has likely reluctantly concluded he must take more decisive steps to distance himself from, or preferably, control SG. These measures do not represent a strategic shift in Sadr's positions toward, or increased willingness to engage with, the Gol or CF. Sadr loses little by divesting disobedient SG, who mar Sadr's reputation. However, he realizes more aggressive steps against SG could risk further defections and fracturing.

Iran Outlines Iraqi Security Plan at Neighbors Conference



Iranian Foreign Minister
Manouchehr Mottaki



Iraqi Officials
at Neighbors' Conference

1.4b, 1.4d

1.4b, 1.4d

Mixed Messages From JACF

- Jihad and Change Front (JACF) set conditions for negotiation with CF; refuse engagement with GOI
- JACF's "willingness" to engage with CF conflicts with statements by Front's members, especially the 1920 Revolutionary Brigades
- Open engagement with CF unlikely, goes against previously stated goals and activities


**JACF's conditions
for negotiation with
Coalition Forces:**

- CF announcing a full withdrawal
- Releasing all detainees
- Cancelling all laws and agreements passed under occupation

Assessment: JACF aware conditions for negotiation with CF will not be met; required to maintain perception of anti-CF posture. Current approach an effort to maintain legitimacy among constituency. Publicity of potential covert engagement likely to result in JACF pull-back and continued anti-CF rhetoric.

SVEST, VBIED Attack on CLC Sheikh


- 14 Nov, SVEST, VBIED attack on Sheikh Imad Mohammed Telal al Ghurtani
 - SVEST detonates inside Sheikh's home
 - VBIED detonates outside of home
 - 1 x Sheikh KIA, 8 x LN WIA
- Sheikh Imad Telal al Ghurtani
 - Sunni, influence in Musayyib and Iskandariyah
 - Responsible for 175 CLCs for Ghurtani (Sunni) and Jabouri (Shia) tribes
 - First interim President of North Tribal Council
- Strategic Implications
 - Death will weaken Ghurtani and Jabouri tribes
 - Alters balance of tribal influence



Assessment: While Sheikh Ghurtani's death will have an impact on the balance of tribal power within the AO, it will likely not have an adverse effect on the local CLCs as other Sheikh's are in line to assume command.

CLC Impact in Baghdad

- Recent tactical reporting suggests CLC in the Adhamiyah neighborhood actively tipping CF/ISF in VBIED finds
 - CLC tipped five confirmed, three suspected VBIEDs
 - AQI losing permissive environment in Adhamiyah
- Strategic Implications
 - Continued indications of AQI degradation
 - Effectiveness of local security initiatives partnered with CF, ISF
- Sunni Resistance reactions
 - Members leaving the insurgency
 - Following tribal leaders in joining CLCs and IP
 - Approve of CLCs and 'awakening' groups in opposing AQI; disapprove of cooperation with CF



Assessment: Continued effectiveness of CLCs contingent upon Gol partnership, integration into ISF. Sunni resistance focused on restoring honor, controlling local areas. Indigenous Sunnis increasingly forced to seek out cooperation from other groups and CF as a means of survival and rally point for all Sunnis.

New Foreign Terrorist Facilitation Line Nearly Complete

- **Syria-based Extremist Abu-Walid al-Maqqdisi Establishing new FTF Line**
 - Abu-Walid working with Lebanon-based extremist Imad on FTF line
 - Early NOV: Informs Imad FTF line nearly complete
- **New Route Separate from Abu Ghadiyah**
 - Per Walid, Ghadiyah Controls Only FTF line into Iraq
 - Imad Does Not Trust Ghadiyah
- **Previous FTF Routes Degraded**
 - AQI border Amir Abu Muthanna
 - Abu-Usama al-Tunisi



Assessment: If established, Abu Walid's new line could increase opportunities for FTs to transit Syria. However, competition between Imad and Ghadiyah could also result in increased internal dissension amongst Syrian FTFs. The Government of Syria will likely attempt to infiltrate or disrupt Abu Walid's effort if they become aware of the new line.

Iran's Nuclear Program

- **Iran gestures to meet key UN demand**
 - Blueprints on molding uranium likely “leaked” to deter more aggressive UN sanctions
 - IAEA report: Iran has made progress, but response lacks transparency, more cooperation needed
 - Tehran argues it is leaning forward
 - IAEA Chief el-Baradei puts positive spin on report
 - No value added to IAEA understanding of nuclear history—3rd round of sanctions possible
- **Former senior nuclear negotiator Hossein Mousavian, accused of spying—again**
 - Detained 30 Apr–9 May; Rafsanjani brokered release
 - Deliberate message Ahmadinejad to Rafsanjani moderates: Conservatives are in control
 - Ahmadinejad values loyalty above experience
 - Determined to solidify influence over nuclear policies
 - Will fill key vacancies with protégés before 2009 election



(U) Hossein Mousavian

1.4b, 1.4d

SAI/Senior OMS Follow-On Meeting Unlikely

- **SAI continues strategic plans**
 - Engaging various Iraqi groups
 - Ongoing discussion with ISCI/Badr
 - Anbar Delegation visit US in November
 - Dealing with more receptive environment
- **SAI proposed meeting with OMS Delegation**
 - OMS will likely decline
 - SAI too close to Americans
- **SAI/OMS previously met in May**
 - Agreed on generalities



Anbar Delegation in U.S.




22 May SAI/OMS Senior Meeting

Assessment: SAI's increasingly active and successful national engagement program will contribute to reconciliation with willing Shi'a partners at the expense of OMS. Senior OMS will be reluctant to engage with organizations having a close relationship with CF; reduces reconciliation with significant Sunni organization.

MoF Convoy Hit by SVBIED

- SVBIED detonated evening of 18 NOV on Karada Peninsula
- Media: Rusafa IP reported MoF Convoy in the vicinity of the blast
 - Salman al-Mugotar, MoF advisor in convoy, reportedly unharmed
 - Rusafa IP report 2 PSD among wounded
- MoF remains key target for extremists
 - Murder and intimidation campaigns, use of suicide VBIEDs primary AQI TTP
 - Event follows 2 assassinations of MoF officials in the past two months
 - Economic health and functionality key indicator of GoI effectiveness



(S//REL) SVBIED Location, Wreckage Being
Cleared

Assessment: Though GoI officials likely remain lucrative targets for Sunni extremists, it cannot be proven definitively that the MoF convoy was the intended target of this attack. The convoy was more likely a chance target in an attack planned as part of intimidation campaign against Shia populace.

Sunni Religious Leadership Tensions

- **Sunni Endowment closes AMS main office in Umm al-Qura mosque**
 - AMS blames Sunni Endowment and al-Samarra'i as being tools of government forces and intentions
 - Al-Samarra'i claims AMS justifies and attempts to legitimize the criminal actions of AQI and thus impedes progress in Iraq
 - Tawafuq Front declares closure of AMS offices and Umm al-Qura radio station regrettable; urges a retraction of the decision and calls for unity



Ahmad 'Abd al-Ghafur al-Samarra'i
Head of Sunni Endowment




Harith Sulayman Al-Dhari Al-Zawbai
Head of Association of Muslim Scholars

Assessment: Harith al-Dhari will have to prove his anti-AQI credentials in order to sustain his status as a victim of Gol and CF machinations. Sunni Endowment reputation will depend on the ability of al-Samarra'i to show his actions are independent of Coalition Force influence.

Varied JAM Responses to Baghdad CLCs

- Baghdad JAM escalates violence in select areas
 - JAM fighting reportedly kills five Sunni Sahawa members in Aamel
 - Violence flairs, despite a CLC/JAM agreement to return displaced Sunni
 - JAM fighting against Shi'a CLCs in Adhamiyah
- Kadhamiyah JAM CDR intends to form Shi'a version of Anbar Awakening
 - Working with Shi'a Tribal leaders to solidify control in Kadhamiyah
 - Willing to cooperate with CF to further their goals
- Sadrists disagree over whether to oppose or support CLCs



Assessment: While multi-faceted, cooperative relationships are emerging in Baghdad, many JAM commanders will attempt to exploit CLCs for self-preservation, consolidation of control, or legitimization of JAM operations. Expect sporadic localized violence to persist, as JAM seeks to maintain influence.

Syria Shows Off Border Security Efforts


- (U) Foreign diplomats and reporters tour SY-IZ border
 - (U) Ambassadors expressed satisfaction with Syrian efforts
 - (U) Security measures included:
 - Sand barriers
 - Holes to prevent vehicle crossing
 - Six border guards per post
 - Outposts every 400 yards
- (U) Patrols lack equipment
 - (U) Border commander - guards lack long range vision equipment, communications devices
 - (U) SY FM - western countries need to provide modern equipment, Iraqis need to control their side of border



(C//REL) Assessment: Damascus continues efforts to improve border security and surveillance. However, the border remains porous due to border guard susceptibility to bribery, lack of resources, and insufficient coordination with regional neighbors.

VBIEDs Target IP and Infrastructure in Mosul Area

- 2x SVBIEDs detonated approx. 2 km apart, SE Mosul, 23 NOV
 - Total CAS: 21 killed, 25-35 injured, including IPs and civilians
 - Detonations separated by 15 minutes
 - Attacks target IPs
- AQI likely responsible; likely coordinated SVBIED attacks to maximize psychological impact
- 1315D TBIED attack on Qayyarah Bridge
 - Likely intended to cut CF supply lines, disrupt operational momentum
 - Explosion dropped full span of bridge



Assessment: AQI attempting resurgence in Mosul, trying to stave off CLC/Sahawa momentum in order to maintain strategic foothold in MND-N.

Limited Appeal of SCJL

- (U) Religiously motivated Sunni insurgent groups criticized Supreme Command of Jihad and Liberation (SCJL) due to its secular Ba'athist roots
 - Naqshabandi responded with a public statement defending its stand using Islamic legal provisions
 - Statement called on all factions to unite under the Ba'ath party banner
- (U) Naqshabandi insurgent group joined the SCJL
 - Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri created SCJL with the intent of uniting all who oppose the Coalition
 - SCJL includes 21 most likely inactive or lesser-known insurgent groups; one removed affiliation 20 NOV

SCJL Affiliated Groups

Army of the Men of the Naqshabandi Order

Hanin Army

Al-Murabitin Army

Al-Sahabah Army

Al-Hamzah Army

Al-Risalah Army

Ibn-al Walid Army

The Mujahidin Central Command (Iraq)

Al-Tahrir Brigades

Al-Mustafa Army

The Liberation of Iraq Army

Al-Shuhada Army

Al-Sabirin Army

Jihad in the Land of Two Rivers Brigade

Al-Faris Army for the Liberation of the Autonomy Region

Jihad in Basra Brigades

National Popular Front for the Liberation of Iraq

Brigades for the Liberation of the South

Brigades of the Altaf Husayniyyah Revolution

Diyala for Jihad and Liberation Brigades

AL- Majid Brigades for the Liberation of Iraq

As of 20 NOV denies affiliation

Recent attacks against the coalition

~~(C//REL)~~ **Assessment:** al-Duri understands the need to broaden the Ba'ath party's base of support to maintain the party's relevance. By inviting all who oppose Coalition Forces to join SCJL, al-Duri is attempting to expand his appeal beyond Ba'ath party members. SCJL's failure to attract significant insurgent groups confirms al-Duri's waning influence in Iraq.




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Arkan Hasnawi

- Hasnawi continues attacks, despite freeze
 - Intends to continue attacks against CF
 - Led high profile 28 October kidnapping of Sunni Sheikhs
- JAM leadership frustrated with Hasnawi
 - October, Hasnawi claimed he was fired by Sadr, would continue to work as a SG leader
 - Early November, Hasnawi sought for trial in Najaf
 - Mid-November, senior JAM committee considered replacements for Hasnawi
- Fellow SG Commanders fleeing
 - Six key Baghdad SG leaders departing for Iran, including Sheikh Baqir, who facilitated the 28 October kidnapping



Arkan Hasnawi

Assessment: The exodus of SG leaders most likely reflects concern about CF targeting. Despite Sadrist anger over Hasnawi's public and flagrant violation of the freeze, senior JAM is moving deliberately to replace Hasnawi, possibly due to JAM's inability to expel or control Hasnawi and his unit.


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Iraq to Iran Crude Oil Pipeline

- (U) Agreement signed between Iraq and Iran to

build a crude oil pipeline between Basrah and Abadan, Iran

- Proposed 32-inch crude oil pipeline, estimated capacity 300,000 bbl/d
- Proposed second pipeline for refined products
 - Refined fuels shortage in Iran makes product pipeline proposal uncertain
- Oil to be sold at market value
- Iran loaning \$1 billion to Iraq for project
- Oil Minister Shahrستاني signed the Agreement on 10 August




Basrah, Iraq and Abadan, Iran

~~(C//REL)~~ **Assessment:** Agreement supports Iraq's effort to rebuild, expand oil infrastructure and export capacity. Further intertwines Iranian-Iraqi economies, expands Iranian inroads into international community. Pipeline potentially presents new opportunities for corruption and oil smuggling, necessitating careful metering and monitoring.

Foreign Terrorist Flow Downward Trend

- Foreign terrorist flow at two-year low
 - Syria-based facilitators suffering financial shortages
 - Focused on sending only suicide operatives into Iraq
 - Despite periodic cash infusions, facilitation problems persist
- Coalition operations and tribal / CLC initiatives hindering facilitation
 - Iraq-Syria Border Emir Abu-Hazim captured
 - Tribes / CLCs have deprived AQI of key safe-havens and secure locations for weapons caches



Assessment: Funding issues and continued attrition of facilitators internal and external to Iraq is causing significant disruption to Syria-based AQI facilitation networks. Sustained pressure through MNF-I offensive operations and Sunni local / tribal initiatives will continue to reduce the number of suicide attacks.

JACF/JARF Merger Unlikely

- (U) Jihadist forums preaching unity within the resistance community
- (U) Article posted on jihadist forum: 'Positions on which the JARF and JACF agree'
 - (U) Points of agreement include: fighting for Coalition withdrawal, rejecting partition of Iraq
- ~~(S//REL)~~ Did not address the major points of difference
 - ~~(S//REL)~~ Role of the Association of Muslim Scholars, support of the 'Awakening Movement'
 - (U) Divergent themes in public statements

Jihad and Reformation Front (JARF)

- Islamic Army of Iraq
- Ansar al Sunna (Legal Council)
- Jaysh al Fatihin
- Al Da'wa wa'al Qital

Jihad and Change Front (JACF)

- 1920 Revolutionary Brigade
- Jaysh al Rashidin
- Jaysh al Muslimi
- Islamic Movement for the Iraqi Mujahidin

~~(S//REL)~~ **Assessment:** Despite insurgent community discussions, merger of JACF and JARF remains in doubt. With the groups fractionalized, the opportunity remains for Coalition Forces to engage with them as a divided front.

Recent Sadrist Political Activity

- (U) Senior Sadrists reiterate political positions
 - Call for adherence to freeze
 - Freeze presented as a studied decision
 - Likely in response to public doubts about freeze
 - Restated Sadrist position not to engage with CF
- (U) Sadrist delegation on official visit to Egypt
 - Response to an Egyptian official invitation
 - Stated purpose: encourage Arab nation participation in addressing challenges in Iraq
- (U) Sadrists opposed Iraqi participation in Annapolis Conference, asserting:
 - Participation constitutes normalization of relations with Israel
 - Issue would complicate Iraqi political environment



Muqtada al-Sadr



Salah Ubaydi

~~(C//REL)~~ **Assessment:** Sadrist commitment to freeze and foreign diplomacy intended to restore Sadrist reputation as a legitimate, nationalist, and non-sectarian organization; tangible results contingent on a coherent Sadrist political program. Sadrist opposition to Annapolis conference expected, reflects concerns over US involvement in the region.

Diplomatic Offices Reopening in Iraq

- (U) Russian office opened in Irbil, 28 NOV
 - Will issue visas to Iraqis wishing to enter Russia
 - Travel to Baghdad no longer required
 - Inauguration ceremony attended by Russian Ambassador to Iraq, and KRG PM
 - Plans underway to open additional office in Basrah, though no further details yet available
- (U) UN regional office also opened in Irbil, Wed.
 - First of 3 offices UN plans to open



KRG PM Nechirvan Barzani



UN Special
Rep to Iraq
Staffan de
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
Assessment: Reopening of diplomatic offices demonstrates international faith in improving security situation in Iraq. Russia likely using strengthening ties with KRG as step toward furthering its oil interests in Iraq as well as increasing its regional influence.

Syria and Iraq Improving Relationship

- (U) Joint bank agreement signed 26 NOV
 - Goals: increase economic ties and facilitate SY participation in IZ reconstruction
 - Talks between Iraqi MoF and SY Pres on boosting bilateral relations
 - \$15M grant to SY to help with refugee burden
 - Asad – “SY fully willing to support current Gol”
- (U) Iraqi embassy in Damascus organizing free trips for refugees to return
 - UN refugee agency in Damascus announced ~ 60,000 IZ refugees returned since OCT



Iraq MoF Bayan Jabr



Iraqi refugees in Syria

1.4b, 1.4d